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Many studies on verbal irony has mostly concentrated on the definition and 
nature of irony, i.e., the question of "what is verbal irony?" The motive for the 
use of verbal irony, on the other hand, has not been the center of the studies 
of verbal irony as much. To answer the question of motivation, or "Why 
people use verbat irony", I would like to look at situational irony based on 
one study on situational irony (Lucariello, 1994). Situational irony is often 
precluded in the discussions on verbal irony, for the two "ironies" are 
regarded as belonging to different domains. Situational irony, however, has 
much to do with verbal irony in many ways. Both kinds of irony entail 
opposition or juxtaposition of incompatibles and require shared knowledge: the 
shared concept of irony in situational irony and the evaluation of the 
circumstances which trigger irony. Regarding processing route, both ironies are 
explained more plausibly with one-stage process view. These findings further 
support the claims of mention theory of verbal irony, which emphasizes the 
role of shared background between speaker and hearer in the communication 
of verbal irony. I would thus conclude that the verbal irony should be 
approached communicatively. (Seoul National University) 
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1. Introduction 
There have been a number of researches and literatures on the nature 
of verbal irony. Verbal irony refers to utterances like the following, 
usually delivered with sarcastic intention: 
(1) I really love to spend summer here in Houston. speaker is driving 
a car whose air conditioner is out of order when it is over llOF.) 
This special kind of language use has drawn attention of many linguists 
as well as rhetoricians and literary scholars, for verbal irony is widely 
used in everyday experience by common language users. Most of the 
studies answer to this question: "what is verbal irony?' Studies on verbal 
irony attempt to explain how irony is distinguished from non-irony, what 
elements constitute it, and how an ironical utterance is interpreted. 
Another question, however, is not answered as much. Why do people 
use verbal irony? This question is concerned about the motivation for 
the use of vertal irony. To be specific, by what is the verbal irony initiated 
in speaker's mind? The nature of verbal irony can be more plausibly 
explained by exploring what triggers speaker's production of ironical 
utterance. 
In this paper, I would like to answer to the question of "why" by 
examining the relation between verbal irony and situational irony. 
Situational irony denotes situations in life which is viewed as ironical, 
such as a toothless dentist or Oedipus killing his father not howing 
who he is. Situational irony is often precluded in the discussions on 
verbal irony, for verbal irony and situational irony are regarded as 
belonging to different domains; the former to the domain of language 
use, or figure of speech and the latter to the domain of human experience 
in general. Even though the two kinds of irony cannot be treated in 
a similar way, however, the relation W e e n  them is worth considering. 
Verbal irony is a language-related phenomena, but it cannot be d i m  
outside of a situation (Utsumi 2030: 1778). A situational setting that 
motivate irony is a prerequisite for speaker's production of verbal irony. 
That situation, of course, cannot be identified with what the term 
"situational irony" denotes, as Utsumi (2000) points out. My hypothesis 
is that people's concept about situational irony plays a role in mgnizing 
a situation that motivates irony in some ways. Also, I claim that the 
role of situational irony in understanding verbal irony will be a strong 
support for the mention theory of irony, which has been claimed by 
Sperber and Wilson (1986,1998) and Wilson and Sperber (1992) many 
times. 
2. Review of the previous studies 
The traditional view of verbal irony defines irony as "saying one thing 
and meaning. or implicating. the opposite (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 
240)" In this view, irony is a trope, or a figure of speech. I would like 
to rwiew briefly what the modem theories of irony has been discussed. 
A number of studies that has been made about verbal irony can be 
divided into two big streams. One is linguistic approach, which focuses 
on the logical structure of ironic language and explain it in the frame 
of the Gricean notion of conversational maxim and the violation of the 
maxim. This approach is "essentially a rewording in linguistic terms of 
the traditional theory of irony as a trope" (Attardo 2000: 794); that is, 
the ironical meaning is processed through some special device like 
implicature after the literal interpretation of the utterance is rejected as 
inappropriate. Grice defines irony as a case where "the speaker flouts 
the maxim of quality". (Barbe 1995 38) Another recent research that 
represents this approach is Giora (1995). She views verbal irony as a 
mode of indirect negation. She makes a point that irony understanding 
involves both the processing of the negated message (what is said) and 
the processing of the implicated message, so that the difference between 
them may be computed (Giora 1995: 239). By communicating negation 
indirectly, she argues, irony achieves what direct negation can't; it 
communicates absolute degree of negation by avoiding the graded 
interpretation that direct negation usually imply. The indirect negation 
view is partly compatible with the theories of Grice. Both assume a 
two-stage processing that involves literal interpretation first and ironic, 
non-literal interpretation secondly. The linguistic approach presupposes 
the dichotomy of literal and non-literal languages. In both theories, verbal 
irony requires a two-stage deciphering procedure whereby both the 
literal and the ironic meanings are computed (Giora 1995). Literal 
meaning of an ironic utterance is thus preserved. 
The second approach to verbal irony is called psychological or 
cognitive approach. The mention theory of irony has been one of the 
most influential studies with this approach. It challenges the meaning 
substitution view asserted by the traditional and Gricean theories of 
irony. Mention theory defines verbal irony as echoic utterance from 
which speaker dissociates herself. Ironic utterance is echoic because it 
dws not represent what the speaker really thinks but "indirectly quotes" 
the thoughts or utterances which someone else has. The following is 
a good example: 
(2) He: It's a lovely day for a picnic. 
[They go for a picnic and it rains] 
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So far, I reviewed some theories of verbal irony and discussed their 
different standpoints. Lastly, I introduce a study on different subject: 
situational irony. Lucariello (1994)'s psychological study of situational 
irony examines whether "situational irony is a commonly shared concept 
that exhibits typifying features and internal structure" (Lucariello 
1994130). Ironic events have some key features such as unexpectedness, 
human fragility, outcome (e.g., loss and win) and opposition. Lucariello 
claims that ironic events can be classified into some categories with these 
features and that people share a concept about event which is regarded 
as ironic. In cognition, ironic events thus belong to a different kind of 
event domain from which non-ironic events belong to. Her study leads 
us to the way to understand verbal irony. Lucariello notes that verbal 
irony shares some features of situational irony, such as unexpectedness 
and juxtaposition of incompatibles (Lucariello 1994: 129). Though not 
explicitly discussed, the notion of ironic event domain has a potential 
to evidence the claim made by mention theorists that interpretation of 
verbal irony does not require the dichotomy of literal and non-literal 
language and a two-stage interpretation. 
Now I would like to make my claims concerning the relation between 
situational irony and verbal irony through the rest of this paper. 
3. Claims 
One of the main motives for using verbal irony would be a speaker's 
intention to make a sarcastic effect by contrasting her utterance with 
the situation which caused it. Sometimes, the desire for contrasting itself 
acts as a motivation. It is necessary, then, for the speaker to recognize 
the present situation as the one in which she can use irony. How can 
the speaker recognize whether it is the situation suitable for an ironic 
utterance or not and by what "cues" can he know it? I will look for 
the answer in the mechanisms of understanding situational irony. 
Situational irony, such as dramatic irony or irony of fate, should not 
be confused with the situation of ironic utterance, or the circumstances 
that trigger verbal irony. It d m ,  however, share a good deal of properties 
with verbal irony. Both entail a juxtaposition of incompatibles: what is 
speaker's and hearer's faces more than a direct reproach does. 
said (literal meaning) versus what is intended (non-literal meaning) in 
the verbal case and what occurred versus what was expected to occur 
in the situational case (Lucariello 1994: 129). Verbal irony entails 
unexpectedness as situational irony does. Both are more or less, but 
necessarily concerned with a deviation from a desirable state, too. 
From these, we cannot but acknowledge that the properties of verbal 
irony that mention theory suggats are very similar or closely related 
to those of situational irony. Though Sperber and Wilson or other 
researchers of the mention theory hardly noted or discussed about 
situational irony, the claims of mention theory of irony accord with the 
concepts of situational irony. What is echoed in ironic utterance is 
sometimes social norms or states regarded as desirable. When the 
situation seems not to conform to the speaker's expectation or to what 
she thinks as desirable, she can make an ironical utterance by echoing 
and simultaneously dissociates herself from it. For the relevance theory, 
which bred the mention theory of irony, views communication as hearex's 
inference of the most relevant interpretation in the given discourse 
context, what is important in understanding irony is also the context 
of the ironic utterance. That's why shared knowledge is stressed on by 
mention theorists. I will discuss on these points along with Lucariello's 
findings about situational irony in the nest section. 
I argue that both speaker and hearer share the concept of situational 
irony when they use and interpret verbal irony. From this, the claim 
of mention theory can get another support Furthermore, I'd like to argue 
that verbal irony should be understood communicatively, not within the 
frame of truth-conditional semantics. 
4. Situational irony 
According to Lucariello (1994), situational irony is a concept, in 
psychological term, which has an internal structure and external 
structure. What is the internal shucture like? How is knowledge of ironic 
events related to knowledge of other event types? 
4.1. A taxonomy of ironic event type 
In Lucariello (1994), the types and characteristic features of situational 
irony are introduced first to classify ironic events (Study 1). Seven major 
types (Imbalances, Losses, Wins, Double Outcomes, Dramatic, Catch-22, 
Coincidence) were identified according to their typifying characters (i.e. 
the characteristic features). Among four characteristic features, the two 
main ones Lucariello's study identifies are Unexpectedness, a necessary 
but not sufficient one, and human fragility, which can be also thought 
a theory of the world's undependability. There are two other features: 
outcome and opposition All of the ironic events classified share a notion 
of "events gone awry"; that is, an event occurred in a way one nwer 
expected it would happen, causing negative effect for the experiencer 
of the went in most cases (except for the type Wins and some subtype 
events of Double Outcomes). The examples are such as The poor banker 
or A kiss that s ip@ befrayal. In Imbalances, opposition is a critical 
feature. She notes that "a sharp cancelling out dynamic operates in such 
ironies, wherein one action or a state negates or opposes another 
(Lucariello's italic)". 
Verbal irony shares two key features with the type Imbalances; 
unexpectedness and opposition. Unexpectedness is the feeling the ironist 
has towards the situation and opposition is what the ironist creates by 
her utterance. The opposition of verbal irony is, however, not created 
out of nothing by the speaker. Rather, the speaker makes the implicit 
(intra-personal or psychological) oppositional character of the ironic 
environment explicit. The speaker contrasts the unexpected situation 
with what she has expected or what she thinks more desirable. 
4.2 Do individuals share a concept of situational irony? 
The second experimental study performed in Lucariello (1'394) ('hereafter, 
Study 2) used a category production task, which required subjects to 
list 5 separate situations that they think of as ironic. The naive subjects 
generated all types and subtypes identified in the taxonomy of Study 
1. Those went types that exhibit the important category features of 
opposition (in the type Imbalances), outcome (type Losses), and 
opposition in relation to outcome (type Double outcomes) were more 
frequently produced than the types which lack key category features. 
The category of situational irony was found to exhibit internal structure. 
Among Imbalances (the most frequently produced event type), the 
subtypes that exhibit strong opposition were the most frequent, especially 
those in which the opposition is intrapersonal (Temporal and Contextual 
Imbalances, e.g., The wimp who grows zip to be a lion tanzer or The poor 
banker). Among Losses, self-inflicted loss forms were most frequent. 
These results imply that opposition is the most strong factor of 
ironicalness, especially when it exists within one agent. 
The result of Study 2 shows there is a generally shared concept about 
"ironicalness" between people. That's why one irony type is judged as 
more prototypical situational irony than another. The knowledge is 
manifest when a person thinks a situation as ironic. I argue this kind 
of shared knowledge is also required in producing and interpreting 
verbal irony. That knowledge would not be the same one as the shared 
concepts of situational irony. A speaker and a hearer of ironic utterance, 
however, must also make a judgement whether the situation can be 
accepted as an ironic environment and that judgement will be based 
on the shared knowledge. For both the speaker and the hearer involved 
in a verbal irony, shared knowledge about ironic environment is 
necessary. Verbal irony requires common knowledge as other verbal 
communication does. This common knowledge, however, would differ 
in some ways from the shared background required for communication 
in general. In the case of irony, this shared knowledge need to involve 
value judgement, which has to do with the ironist's intention in the 
utterance. Let's look at one example: 
(3) What a lovely party! (in the middle of a lousy party) 
(from Giora, 1995) 
In this utterance, the speaker and the hearer share the knowledge that 
tlze pnrfy is lousy in the first place. This howledge would be enough 
for success of the normal mode of communication if the speaker said 
"What a lousy party!" For the successful communication of irony, 
however, the interlocutors need more. They must agree (implicitly, at 
least) with the notion that a parfy slwuld not be lousy (or the hearer must 
know that the speaker wants him to have the same idea, at least). Only 
after sharing an idea that the situation presented in the discourse context 
is not desirable or far from the expected, irony can be successfully 
communicated. What is echoed in that ironical utterance is closely related 
with the shared knowledge (i.e. the presupposed idea): the notion that 
a party should not be lousy (i.e., should be lovely). 
That verbal irony need more shared knowledge than other kind of 
verbal communication should not be misunderstood. Verbal irony is not 
a figure of speech outside ordinary verbal communication but a subtype 
of verbal communication which require the participants share more. In 
short, the fact that there is shared knowledge especially required for 
understanding verbal irony reveals the communicative character of 
verbal irony, which linguistic analyses fail to explain. 
4.3 Different domains of event knowledge and processing of 
ironic events 
Situational irony has external structure as well as internal structure. The 
external structure means "the place of the concept of situational irony 
in the complete knowledge base" (Lucariello 1994: 143). A knowledge 
structure is established for ironic event, along with other event 
knowledge structure like the script2. The third and last experimental 
study in Lucariello (1994) supports this fact by showing that subjects 
can reliably differentiate among three event kinds: expected events, 
unexpected ironic events, and unexpected non-ironic events. The subjects 
2 "The script is a general knowledge structure or schema for events that realize a high 
possibility of expectation. Scripts underlie frequently enacted activities, such as going 
to a restaurant, or more conventional ones, such as getting married." (Zucariello 19% 
130) 
especially recognized unexpected ironic events and unexpected 
non-ironic events as distinguished kinds of events. Distinguished from 
unexpected non-ironic events, ironic events have internal structure. A 
general knowledge structure is established for ironic events and a 
culturally recognized pattern is observed in them, too (Lucariello 1994: 
143). 
Lucariello argues that situational irony has a similarity to verbal irony 
in this respect. As a distinct went-based concept, situational irony may 
challenge the normative theory of events as verbal irony challenges 
semantic theories of meaning (Lucariello 1% 143). The domain of went 
knowledge is not only established for prescriptive events (i.e., the script) 
but for a vast array of events. Situational irony is a general knowledge 
structure for some events that take a striking turn, whereas the script 
is a representation for events that unfold prescriptively. The issue 
concerning the processing of ironic event is naturally raised. There are 
two possible processing routes. The first one is serial processing where 
knowledge of what is expected to happen (the script) is activated first. 
If the expectation is violated, then the knowledge of non-expected event 
such as situational irony is activated to interpret the went. This two-stage 
procedure has analogy to the processing of verbal irony suggested by 
some studies which make a distinction between literal language and 
figurative language. On the alternative processing route, on the other 
hand, both script knowledge and ironic event knowledge are accessed 
when one experiences events. Lucariello (1994) regards this route as the 
more likely one. One of the reason is that irony comprehension requires 
the simultaneous juxtaposition of what actually happened and what is 
expected to happen. This processing route of ironic events reminds us 
of the processing of verbal irony suggested by the mention theory. What 
is echoed in the utterance (what is expected) and the ironic environment 
(what really happened) is simultaneously juxtaposed by ironic utterance. 
Echo makes that "juxtaposition" possible, for it invites the unrealized 
'tYhat it must be" into the reality, which has gone awry from the speaker's 
point of view. The interpreter of verbal irony thus doesn't need to exert 
effort to process the literal meaning to interpret irony. Hence it is 
demonstrated that "verbal irony is a case for meaning beyond literal, 
semantic meaning" (Lucariello 1994: 143). The theory on situational irony 
thus supports the argument of echo theory of verbal irony. 
From the discussions so far, the similar mechanisms of situational irony 
and verbal irony are revealed. I made a point that this similarity is not 
fortuitous but based on the similar mechanism of cognition. Considering 
that relationship, one may also assume that recognizing the concept of 
situational irony can possibly act as the grounds for production and 
comprehension of verbal irony. 
5. Conclusion 
Situational irony has a lot to do with verbal irony. Both involves the 
notion of unexpectedness and opposition. Both can be understood only 
on the basis of some kind of shared knowledge. The processing of verbal 
irony doesn't require processing of its literal meaning first, just as 
prescriptive event knowledge need not be activated first for the 
comprehension of situational irony. 
These findings on the relationship between verbal irony and situational 
irony can be used as a g w d  support for mention theory of verbal irony. 
Especially, the concept of echo can be more refined in this respect. The 
term "echo" defined by Sperber and Wilson (1998) which is a technical 
term and deliberately broad, includes not only the reproduction of what 
someone else said or thought but also social norms, desirable states and 
standard expectation. The latter three instantiations of echo can be 
explained in relation with "prescriptive events" all together. This term 
used in opposition to ironic events in the study of situational irony 
seems--ironically, indeed-to give an adequate description to the echoic 
nahm of verbal irony. The notion of "prescriptive eventst' binds the broad 
range of sources of echo together under one name. It may be able to 
work as a good source of counter-argument against any criticism on 
the loose definition of echo. 
Back to the question of "why", I also confirmed that circumstances 
evoke the use of verbal irony. Although the circumstances where verbal 
irony is used does not precisely coincide with the situations recognized 
as ironic, the knowledges on situational irony stored in human mind 
may trigger a feeling that a contradictory (ironic) utterance would make 
the present undesirable situation more endurable one: an ironic situation 
abound in human world. How it is done is explained in relation with 
the ideas of situational irony and the mention theory. Situational irony 
support the idea that verbal irony is a mode of verbal communication. 
Verbal irony should be approached communicatively rather than purely 
linguistically, which is how the traditional and (Neo-)Gricean accounts 
deal with it. 
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